Title: Regarding the Moral Argument Question: Here are some common objections against the moral argument for the existence of God: Mr. Vuletic writes: "Take the hypothesis that theism explains transcendental moral facts by positing a god who can create them by divine fiat. Let us ask by virtue of what it is that any god could create transcendental moral facts. If the believer responds that it is by virtue of being a god, the believer has explained nothing - it would be just as well for me to claim that I can create transcendental moral facts, and when asked how this can be so, explain that I am able to do so by virtue of being me. All the believer can do is claim that gods can create transcendental moral facts by virtue of having a special and mysterious power that allows them to do so. But look what has happened - now instead of having one mystery (mysterious transcendental moral facts), we have three mysteries (mysterious transcendental moral facts, a mysterious god, and a mysterious power to create transcendental moral facts). We have not even solved the original mystery, since one can hardly explain something by appealing to the inexplicable and incomprehensible". [http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/moral.html]. Regarding transcendental moral knowledge, Mr. Vuletic adds: " ... [N]o god in fact tells us what the transcendental moral facts are. How many people have ever had Jehovah drop by in person to explain what is right and wrong? A few lucky prophets at most. But even if Jehovah were to go from door to door, handing everyone alive a mimeograph of his rules of conduct, how would this constitute knowledge of transcendental right and wrong? We would still have to use our own judgement to determine whether what we are being told is moral; if not, then how could we tell whether the being telling us what to do is in fact Jehovah, rather than Satan cleverly disguised and seeking to mislead us? The same uncertainties apply to any prophets or texts which claim to speak for Jehovah--even to miracle-workers, since - as many believers are quick to point out whenever miracles in a religion other than their own are at issue - demons, too, can perform miracles. But this is all moot, since no one who claims to have knowledge of transcendental moral facts believes he or she is simply taking the words of some being or book at face value. No, those who claim to have such knowledge invariably believe that they have some direct and immediate connection to those facts. But how does adding a god to the picture explain such a mysterious connection any more than positing that such connections are part of the natural order of things? Theism once again multiplies mysteries rather than solving them." There are no such things as 'moral facts.' People would behave as they do now even if they believed there were no such things as moral facts. They would continue to be guided by their deepest cares and concerns. Notions of 'Morals' and 'Ethics' arise from the need to establish order and stability in a society or civilization. There is nothing transcendental about them, they simply appear when a society, civilization, or polity needs to organize itself. As for the standardization of certain ethical principles, it can be explained by the interaction of various civilizations over time. If I were to reply to Objection (2), I would mention that, in Islam, we believe that God has clearly laid down His moral and ethical code of conduct for us and while it is true that we must use our own judgment when approached with such a code, we believe that God has embedded in us a basic knowledge of 'right' and 'wrong' -- a knowledge adequate enough for a person to recognize God's Law as the truth and to abide by it. The idea that Satan could introduce such a code is absurd, for the character and nature of Satan prevent him from encouraging anything that is morally 'right' or 'good' or discouraging anything morally 'wrong' or 'evil.' Furthermore, it is not a part of Islamic belief that miracles associated with non-Islamic religions are necessarily inspired by Satan. Please comment on these objections. Thank you and God bless. Omar Sarwar Answer: My observations and comments regarding the referred arguments follow: The First Argument , in its essence, is a refutation of the 'idea' that God has induced moral values in man, on the grounds that those, who ascribe to this idea do not have a complete explanation of how did God Himself conceive of these values and, subsequently, give man the knowledge of these values. Mr. Vuletic is absolutely correct that the theists, generally, do not have a thorough explanation for this phenomena. However, if I cannot explain "how" Einstein conceived the theory of relativity, this lack of explanation of the "howness" does not provide adequate grounds to refute the fact that Einstein did, in fact, conceive that theory. Mr. Vuletic writes: If the believer responds that it is by virtue of being a god, the believer has explained nothing - it would be just as well for me to claim that I can create transcendental moral facts, and when asked how this can be so, explain that I am able to do so by virtue of being me. I agree that this can really be so. However, I, you, Mr. Vuletic, all his associates and all the readers of this writing are internally and fully aware of the fact that neither ourselves nor Mr. Vuletic is the source of our inherent information of moral values. It is only because of this obvious , though non-philosophical, reason that the 'theists' prefer to consider 'God' to be the source of their inherent moral values, rather than a Mr. Vuletic. Mr. Vuletic writes: All the believer can do is claim that gods can create transcendental moral facts by virtue of having a special and mysterious power that allows them to do so. For a person who believes that God can create from nothing, even if he cannot explain "how" something can be created from nothing, believing God to be the source of our inherent moral values does not require God to have too special a power or ability. The fact is that for the 'theists' the very nature of the concept of God entails special powers and abilities, the "howness" of which is, indeed, accepted to be incomprehensible for man. Mr. Vuletic further writes: But look what has happened - now instead of having one mystery (mysterious transcendental moral facts), we have three mysteries (mysterious transcendental moral facts, a mysterious god, and a mysterious power to create transcendental moral facts). We have not even solved the original mystery, since one can hardly explain something by appealing to the inexplicable and incomprehensible. Contrary to Mr. Vuletic's analysis, the 'theists' would present the case as: The mystery of the existence of transcendental moral facts, like that of the existence of the vast universe that surrounds us, is explained by the existence of an all-powerful, a moral and a just creator, which we call 'God'. Even though we do not know or even claim to be getting close to the knowledge of the "howness" of God's creations, yet the piece of art that surrounds us is a clear sign of the existence of an unseen Artist, even if we remain unclear about the process through which the 'Artist' could have created that incredible piece of art. In his Second Argument Mr. Vuletic writes: ... [N]o god in fact tells us what the transcendental moral facts are. For a 'theist' the standardized and inherent nature of moral values is a clear evidence of the fact that God - our Creator - has, indeed, taught us these values. However, due to His all-powerful nature, God can teach things to each one of His creations, without ever having to deliver them a lecture. In his Third Argument , Mr. Vuletic writes: There are no such things as 'moral facts.' People would behave as they do now even if they believed there were no such things as moral facts. They would continue to be guided by their deepest cares and concerns. Mr. Vuletic has only replaced the concept of inherent moral values with that of inherent "deepest cares and concerns". The "theists" would explain the source of the inherent "deepest cares and concerns" just as they explain the inherent "moral values". In his Fourth Argument , Mr. Vuletic writes: Notions of 'Morals' and 'Ethics' arise from the need to establish order and stability in a society or civilization. For a 'theist', the establishment of order and stability is the result of adhering to moral and ethical values, not its source. Man inherently knows good from bad and has, on the basis of this inherent knowledge, developed behavioral standards for his society. These behavioral standards have borrowed from man's inherent moral values and knowledge; they are not a source of man's understanding of 'good' and 'evil'. Mr. Vuletic writes: There is nothing transcendental about them, they simply appear when a society, civilization, or polity needs to organize itself. Every person should try to check the accuracy of this 'claim' through introspection. Ask yourselves: When I choose to be 'moral', is it because being 'moral' would benefit my society or is it because I know that that is the right thing to do? Another pertinent question which we need to answer is: When being 'moral' is against the benefit of my society, would immorality then become moral? Under such circumstances, would injustice become just? If what Mr. Vuletic propounds is correct, then collective morality should be synonymous in implication with collective hedonism. Is that truly the case? Mr. Vuletic further writes: As for the standardization of certain ethical principles, it can be explained by the interaction of various civilizations over time. That would indeed be an enlightening analysis. I do submit that etiquette and application of moral values can be culture-specific and maybe greatly influenced by the interaction of various civilizations over time. Yet the idea that a certain set of human beings remained oblivious of moral values till it came in interaction with another society is quite fascinating, if not fantastic. Regards, Moiz Amjad February 25, 2002